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Abstract
Road pricing can improve air quality by reducing and spreading tra¢ c ows. Nev-
ertheless, air quality does not depend only on tra¢ c ows, but also on pollution dis-
persion. In this paper we investigate the e¤ects of the temporal variation in pollution
dispersion on optimal road pricing, and show that time-varying road pricing is needed
to make drivers internalize the social costs of both time-varying congestion and time-
varying pollution. To this end, we develop an ecological economics model that takes
into account the e¤ects of road pricing on integrated daily commuting patterns. We
characterize the optimal road pricing when pollution dispersion varies over the day and
analyze its e¤ects on tra¢ c ows, arrival times, and the number of commuters by car.
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1 Introduction
In 2010, the health costs of air pollution due to road transportation corresponded to about
USD 1 trillion in OECD countries and about USD 1 trillion in China and India alone (OECD
2014). These costs account for the e¤ects of exposure to air pollution on the development of
chronic diseases, respiratory illness, and premature mortality. Epidemiological studies have
shown an approximately linear increase in health risk with increasing exposure to urban air
pollutants like particulate matter, with no demonstrable threshold below which no e¤ects
are quantiable. High spikes of pollution  rather than prolonged lower-level exposure 
impose, however, the largest health hazards for those with impaired respiratory systems
(Heal et al. 2012). Estimates also indicate that more than 80% of people living in urban
areas that monitor air pollution are exposed to air quality levels that exceed World Health
Organization (WHO) limits, that transportation contributes more than half of the many
pollutants emitted into the air, and that despite improvements in some regions, urban air
pollution continues to rise (WHO 2016).
Empirical evidence shows that road pricing can play an important role in reducing tra¢ c
ows and spreading tra¢ c peaks, and thus in reducing and smoothing the emissions of
several pollutants over time. The charging of fees to enter congested downtown areas in
Europe and the United States has been proven to curb congestion and vehicle emissions and
to spread tra¢ c volumes by inducing intertemporal substitution toward unpriced times and
spatial substitution toward unpriced roads (see e.g., Gibson and Carnovale 2015, Foreman
2013, and Daniel and Bekka 2000). Time-varying road pricing o¤ers a more cost-e¤ective
means of reducing congestion since unlike other policy instruments that raise the cost of all
driving regardless of where and when the driving occurs, they encourage people to both use
less congested routes and drive a little earlier or later to avoid rush hours. The timing of
emissions reduction is important because air quality does not depend only on the emission
rates of pollutants, but also on pollution dispersion (see, e.g., Hayas et al. 1981, Viana et
al. 2005, and Kim et al. 2012). The scientic literature shows that temporal variations
in the meteorological factors that govern air mixing and thus dispersion of locally emitted
pollutants (such as wind speed, vertical temperature stratication, and mixing height) can
exert strong pressures on the dynamics of air quality. Due to the large temporal variation in
these meteorological factors, there is strong average diurnal variation in pollution dispersion
in addition to the variation in hourly tra¢ c ows and consequently vehicular emissions (see
Toth et al. 2011 and Kim et al. 2012).
This paper investigates the e¤ects in the temporal variation of pollution dispersion on
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optimal road pricing. To this end, we develop an ecological economics model of road pric-
ing that takes into account the dynamics of transport-related air pollution. To this end,
commuters make decisions about arrival times and travel mode and the regulator chooses a
time-varying road charge to maximize social welfare. In particular, we assume that the total
number of commuters can choose to commute by either car or public transport. Those who
decide to commute by car choose a time of arrival at work and a time of arrival at home to
minimize their private trip cost, which consists of three components: the travel time cost,
the schedule delay cost, and the time-varying road charge. Moreover, commuters select the
transport mode by comparing the cost of a round trip by car with the cost of a round trip by
public transportation. Hence, the round trip by each transportation mode is not perfectly
inelastic to its price since there is substitution between transportation modes. In such a
setting, we characterize the optimal time-varying road charge and compare it with a charge
that disregards the temporal variation in pollution dispersion.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First, it contributes to a better
understanding of economy-ecology interactions in road transportation, as well as practical
policy insights since time-varying road pricing designed only to spread out congestion peaks
might lead to increased tra¢ c ows when pollution dispersion is the lowest (see e.g., Bonilla
2016).1 Second, it contributes to the literature on transport economics since although a
large literature acknowledges signicant di¤erences between morning and evening commuting
patterns, the dynamic morning and evening tra¢ c patterns have been investigated separately,
and it is often assumed that they are simple mirror symmetries (e.g., Hurdle 1981, De Palma
and Lindsey 2002, and Gonzales and Daganzo 2013). However, if pollution dispersion varies
over the day, the environmental damage and social costs of road transportation are not
symmetric even if the schedule-delay costs for morning and evening commutes are the same.
When deciding whether or not to drive a car, the commuters compare the cost of driving
(which includes the cost for both morning and evening commuting and is endogenous to the
magnitude of the time-varying charge) with the cost of public transportation. Analyzing the
e¤ects of road pricing on a setting that captures neither asymmetries in the social cost of
road transportation over the day nor the price elasticity of the endogeneously determined
demand might lead to over-estimation of the magnitude of the optimal time-varying charge,
a¤ecting the political feasibility of this instrument.
1The fact that temporally varying externalities are better addressed by instruments that follow the vari-
ation in damage (and hence the variation in the externality) is well established in environmental economics
literature. See Coria (2011) and Coria et al. (2016) for practical examples of where the stringency of envi-
ronmental regulations is signicantly increased to account for the variability in the assimilation capacity of
the environment, which poses di¢ cult problems for pollution control policies.
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To the best of our knowledge, very few previous studies have analyzed the e¤ects of
road pricing on integrated daily commuting patterns (e.g., Zhang et al. 2005 and 2008
who analyze travelersbehavior in terms of choosing departure times for their morning and
evening trips and the optimal time-varying road charges and parking fees based on users
commuting behavior and bottleneck dynamics). Nevertheless, these studies only focus on
congestion and disregard the role of road charges in reducing air pollution and how the
dynamics of pollution are a¤ected by the dynamics of travel behavior and variations in
pollution dispersion. As for environmental literature, the study that comes closest to ours
is one by Coria et al. (2015), who analyze how tolls could/should be designed to minimize
the environmental damage from road transportation. Their results indicate that the charges
should be higher at times when there are less favorable meteorological conditions for pollution
dispersion and when there is an increased contribution from non-vehicle sources to pollution.
In contrast to our analysis, their study relies on a series of simplifying assumptions that limit
the scope of the environmental benets derived from the charge and a¤ect its magnitude
and political feasibility. In particular, Coria et al. (2015) disregard the e¤ect that a high
charge (during either the morning or evening commute) might have on modal choice and do
not characterize the rst best but focus instead on estimating a time-varying road charge
that ensures compliance with exogeneously given air quality standards.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the model used to character-
ize the optimal time-varying road charge. In Section 3, we analyze the e¤ects of time-varying
pollution dispersion on tra¢ c ows, arrival times, and the number of commuters by car. In
Section 4, numerical examples are given to illustrate various equilibrium scenarios. Finally,
conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 The Model
Our analysis builds on Chu (1995) by developing an ecological economics model of integrated
daily commuting patterns where the regulator aims to maximize social welfare by choosing a
time-varying road charge that takes into account the dynamics of pollution. Let us assume
that the total number of homogeneous commuters is N . There is a single origindestination
network connected by a tra¢ c corridor. The origin represents a residential area and the
destination a city business center. At the beginning of every day, the commuters travel to
the city center for work in the daytime and return home after work. They can choose to
commute by either car or by bus. The number of individuals commuting by car corresponds
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to NA (hence, the number of indivuals commuting by bus corresponds to NB = N   NA).
All NA commuters travel m miles to work on the same road. Though they have a common
work start time t, each of them can choose an arrival time at work t0 to minimize the private
trip cost c(t0), which consists of three components. First, the travel time cost  m
s(t0) , where
 is the unit cost of travel time and s(t0) is the travel speed of the entire trip in miles per
hour. Second, the schedule delay cost, which corresponds to  [t   t0] if one arrives earlier
than t and  [t0   t] if one arrives later than t. Hence,  represents the unit of cost of
schedule delay early (earliness) and  is the unit of cost of schedule delay late (lateness). In
line with the literature (e.g., Small 1982), we assume that commuters prefer early to late
arrival. Therefore, the relative value of the schedule delay cost is such that  < . Finally,
it is the time-varying road charge (t0).2 Let t0 and t1 represent the times of the rst and
last arrivals, respectively. Thus, the private trip cost c(t0) can be characterized as:
c(t0) =
(
 m
s(t0) +  [t
   t0] + (t0) if t0  t0  t ,
 m
s(t0) +  [t
0   t] + (t0) if t  t0  t1 .
(1)
Following Chu (1995), travel speed s(t0) is determined by the arrival ow f(t0) through
a power speed-ow function given by:
1
s(t0)
=
1
Smax
+

f(t0)
R

; (2)
where Smax is the free-ow speed in miles per hour, R the road capacity, and  the elasticity
of the travel delay with respect to the ow f(t0). Thus, the second term of equation (2)
measures the travel delay associated with the ow f(t0).
Like Coria et al. (2015), we assume that the environmental damage from tra¢ c emissions
D(f(t0)) is a function of the tra¢ c ow f(t0) and pollution dispersion P (t0) given by:
D(f(t0)) = ef(t0) [1  P (t0)] ;
where e is the emissions per vehicle,  is the damage parameter, and P (t0) is the rate of
pollution dispersion, which can vary with time. That is, the environmental damage from
tra¢ c emissions does not depend only on emissions from tra¢ c ow, but also on the fraction
of pollution dispersed. Pollution dispersion is assumed to be exogenous and to vary over
2An implicit assumption of the model is that some drivers have exible schedules and thus, are less
constrained by a specic preferred arrival time t, but have the option to choose an arrival time so as to
achieve better travel conditions.
5
time within the interval [0; 1].3 Thus, the greater the pollution dispersion P (t0), the lower
the environmental damage from tra¢ c emissions for any tra¢ c ow f(t0). Conversely, the
larger the tra¢ c ow, the greater the pollution dispersion needed to keep the environmental
damage D(f(t0)) low.
Let us start by analyzing the choice of a one-way optimal time-varying road charge.
The tra¢ c planner chooses the tra¢ c ow to minimize the social costs of commuting by
car (which correspond to the sum of the environmental damages and the private costs of
commuting) subject to the constraint that all car commuters must arrive between t0 and
t1, i.e.,
R t1
t0
f(t0)dt0 = NA. Thus, his optimization problem can be represented by means of
the following Lagrangian where  is the Lagrangian multiplier.
L =
Z t
t0
f(t0)


m
s(t0)
+  [t   t0] + e [1  P (t0)]

dt0 +Z t1
t
f(t0)


m
s(t0)
+  [t0   t] + e [1  P (t0)]

dt0 + 

NA  
Z t1
t0
f(t0)dt0

.
The rst-order condition w.r.t. f(t0) yields:
 =
8<: 
m
s(t0) +  [t
   t0] + f(t0) d
df(t0)
h
m
s(t0)
i
+ e [1  P (t0)] if t0  t0  t ,
 m
s(t0) +  [t
0   t] + f(t0) d
df(t0)
h
m
s(t0)
i
+ e [1  P (t0)] if t  t0  t1 .
(3)
Note that the right-hand side of equation (3) can be interpreted as the marginal social cost
of arriving at time t0. Comparing the shadow social cost of driving (3) with the private trip
cost in equation (1), it is straightforward to say that the optimal charge should be equal to
the sum of the congestion externality and the environmental externality (which depends on
the pollution dispersion at time t0). Indeed, solving for d
df(t0)
h
m
s(t0)
i
from equation (2), the
optimal charge can be represented as:
(t0) = 

m
s(t0)
  Tf

+ e [1  P (t0)] , (4)
where Tf denotes the free-ow travel time and is equal to mSmax . Thus, the greater the
3The assumption that pollution dispersion is exogenous is a good representation of the short run. However,
scientic literature shows that climate change will have a signicant e¤ect on pollution dispersion (see, e.g.,
Jacob and Winner 2009). Recent studies provide estimates of this climate e¤ect through correlations of air
quality with meteorological variables and perturbation analyses in chemical transport models. The results
point to a detrimental e¤ect of climate change on air quality: the future climate will be more stagnant due
to weaker global circulation and a decreasing frequency of mid-latitude cyclones.
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congestion externality, the larger the optimal charge. By analogy, the greater the pollu-
tion dispersion, the smaller the environmental externality and the lower the optimal charge.
Moreover, even if the congestion externality is the same at two times of the day, the opti-
mal charge may be di¤erent at these two times depending on the pollution dispersion. In
particular, for the same level of congestion, a higher charge is needed at the times when the
pollution dispersion is limited.
To solve for the optimal charge as a function of the parameters of the model, we assume
that the pollution dispersion is a linear function of time:
P (t0) = + t0, (5)
where  represents a background level of pollution dispersion and  the trend over time.
This is to say, pollution dispersion increases over time when  > 0, while the reverse holds
when  < 0.4 In contrast, the optimal charge decreases over time when  > 0, while the
reverse holds when  < 0.
2.1 Finding the Equilibrium for Car Commuters
Given the optimal charge (4) and our assumption regarding pollution dispersion (5), the
private trip cost c(t0) corresponds to:
c(t0) =
8<: 
m
s(t0) +  [t
   t0] + 
h
m
s(t0)   Tf
i
+ e [1  [+ t0]] if t0  t0  t ,
 m
s(t0) +  [t
0   t] + 
h
m
s(t0)   Tf
i
+ e [1  [+ t0]] if t  t0  t1 .
(6)
We know that in equilibrium, those who arrive at t0 or t1 should incur no travel delay,
since otherwise they could unilaterally reduce their cost by arriving slightly before t0 or
slightly after t1. This implies:
c(t0) = Tf +  [t
   t0] + e [1  [+ t0]] ; (7)
c(t1) = Tf +  [t1   t] + e [1  [+ t1]] : (8)
To solve for c(t0), we use the fact that all commuters should have the same private trip cost
c(t0) in equilibrium. Moreover, it holds that c(t0) = c(t0) _ t0  t0  t, and by analogy,
4This simplifying assumption allows us to keep the model mathematically tractable. However, empirical
evidence shows a non-linear e¤ect of wind speed dispersing urban air pollution concentration above the
background level  described above. We circumvent this issue in Section 3.2 by allowing pollution dispersion
to vary non-monotonically over the day.
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c(t0) = c(t1) _ t  t0  t1, which yields the following condition:
m
s(t0)
=
(
Tf +
+e
[1+]
[t0   t0] if t0  t0  t ,
Tf +
 e
[1+]
[t1   t0] if t  t0  t1.
(9)
Furthermore, since c(t0) = c(t1), we know
t1 =
 + 
   e t
    + e
   e t0: (10)
Combining equations (2) and (9), we can solve for the tra¢ c ow f(t0) as:
f(t0) =
8><>: R
h
+e
m[1+]
[t0   t0]
i 1

if t0  t0  t ,
R
h
 e
m[1+]
[t1   t0]
i 1

if t  t0  t1 .
(11)
Integrating f(t0) over the time intervals [t0; t] and [t; t1], respectively, yields:
Z t
t0
f(t0)dt0 =
mR
 + e

 + e
m[1 + ]
[t   t0]
 1+

; (12)
and Z t1
t
f(t0)dt0 =
mR
   e

 + e
m[1 + ]
[t   t0]
 1+

; (13)
in which we make use of the relations in (10). Recall that
R t1
t0
f(t0)dt0 = NA. We know from
(12) and (13) that:
mR

 + 
[ + e] [   e]
 
 + e
m [1 + ]
[t   t0]
 1+

= NA: (14)
From equation (14) we can solve for t0, which yields:
t0 = t
    [1 + ]
 + e
"
NAm
1

R
[ + e] [   e]
[ + ]
# 
1+
: (15)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (10) yields:
t1 = t
 +
 [1 + ]
   e
"
NAm
1

R
[ + e] [   e]
[ + ]
# 
1+
: (16)
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Finally, since c(t0) = c(t0), we can solve for the cost of a car commuter cA by substituting
equation (15) into equation (7), which yields:
cA = Tf + e [1  [+ t0]] +  [1 + ]
"
NAm
1

R
[ + e] [   e]
[ + ]
# 
1+
: (17)
Note that the cost for a car commuter does not depend on the time t0, which reects the fact
that in equilibrium he/she can unilaterally reduce the travel cost by changing the arrival
time. Moreover, from equations (11), (15), and (16) we can see that the background pollution
dispersion  does not have a direct e¤ect on the arrival times t0 and t1 or the instant ow
f(t0). Nevertheless, the cost cA is an increasing function of NA (and the other way around)
and a decreasing function of the parameter . This is to say, even if the background pollution
dispersion has no direct e¤ect on the timing or density of tra¢ c ow, it a¤ects these factors
indirectly since it reduces the overall social cost of car commutting and therefore increases
the optimal number of car commuters. Recall that @NA
@
can be decomposed as @NA
@(t0)
@(t0)
@
and
@NA
@(t0) < 0,
@(t0)
@
< 0. Hence, background pollution dispersion  reduces the environmental
damage from road transportation, and thereby the optimal road charge. Thus, as for the case
where pollution dispersion is disregarded, accounting for background pollution dispersion
increases the optimal number of car commuters. Furthermore, we have that @t0
@
=  @NA
@
< 0
and @t1
@
= @NA
@
> 0, implying that an increased background pollution dispersion will widen
the time interval for commuting. Since NA increases with , so does the time ow f(t0).
First and last arrival times and the instant ow are also a¤ected by  in a more complex
manner to be analyzed in Section 3.
2.2 Mode Substitutability and Integrated Daily Commuting Pat-
terns
The analysis so far reects only the cost of a one-way trip. However, morning and evening
travel di¤er in terms of pollution dispersion and scheduling preferences (which for the morn-
ing are dened in terms of arrival time at work, whereas preferences for the evening are
dened in terms of arrival time at home). To analyze the case of round trips, let us make use
of the notations (!) and ( ) to refer to parameters and costs of the morning and evening
commute, respectively. Note that if evening commuters also seek to minimize the cost of
their own trip, then the user equilibrium for the evening must be a pattern of arrivals that
allows no commuter to reduce his/her own cost by choosing another arrival time. Thus, the
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cost of commuting by car in the morning and evening is denoted  !cA and   cA respectively,
implying that the total cost of the round trip corresponds to  !cA +  cA.
In equilibrium, the cost of a round trip should be the same for both transport modes.
Therefore, we can solve for the number of car commuters NA by comparing the cost of a
round trip by car with the cost of a round trip by public transportation, which yields:
2p = 2Tf + e
h
2 
h ! + !  !t i  h   +    t ii+ (18)
 [1 + ]
"
NAm
1

R
# 
1+
264
24
h !
 + e
 !

i h !   e ! ih !
 + !
i
35

1+
+
24
h  
 + e
  

i h     e   ih  
 +  
i
35

1+
375 :
From equation (17) it is clear that in our model, morning and evening commutes are mir-
ror symmetries (implying the same social cost of commuting) when  ! =    ,  ! =    = 0, !
 =   , and   =  ! . In such case, the pattern of trip timing in the evening is qualitatively
similar to that in the morning. Since the evening peak would be a mirror image of the morn-
ing with the origin-destination matrix reversed, the number of car commuters can be solved
by equalizing equation (17) to the cost of a one-way bus ticket p. However, as discussed by
de Palma and Lindsey (2002), empirical di¤erences between morning and evening peaks are
apparent and have implications for the potential e¢ ciency gains from congestion pricing, the
magnitude of toll revenues, and the impact of road pricing on commutersprivate costs. In
particular, evening peaks typically last longer and have slightly higher travel speeds. The
di¤erences between morning and evening peaks can be explained by a series of factors, in-
cluding more non-work trips and commuters making more intermediate stop in the evening
(which imply more vehicles on the road and greater travel distances but also more dispersion
of tra¢ c over the road network). They can be also explained by variations in scheduling
preferences by heterogeneous travellers. For instance, work hours are a dominant consid-
eration for many commuters when choosing when to travel. The scheduling preferences of
these individuals are dened mainly in terms of arrival time at work in the morning and
arrival time at home in the evening (de Palma and Lindsey 2002, page 1807).
As described earlier, the aim of this paper is to investigate the e¤ects of the temporal
variation of pollution dispersion on optimal road pricing. Therefore, in the following sections,
we shall conduct some comparisons between the optimal number of car commuters and trip
timing in the case without pollution dispersion versus in the case with pollution dispersion
that varies throughout the day.
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3 E¤ect of Pollution Dispersion on Integrated Daily
Commuting Patterns
In this section, we compare the e¤ects of environmental road pricing on mode substitutability
and intertemporal substitutability in the case of symmetric schedule preferences vis-a-vis
asymmetric schedule preferences. In particular, we compare the number of people commuting
by car, arrival times, and the vehicle ow per hour f(t0) for each case.
3.1 Symmetric schedule-delay cost and increasing pollution dis-
persion
We start our analysis by assuming symmetric schedule-delay cost parameters for the morning
and evening trips, i.e.,
 !
 =    and  ! =    (as in De Palma and Lindsey 2002), implying
that the evening commute is the mirror image of the morning commute (e.g., the cost of
arriving home late is the same as the cost of arriving to the o¢ ce early; and the cost of
arriving home early is the same as the cost of arriving to the o¢ ce late). We also assume
that pollution dispersion follows a constant and increasing time trend over the whole day,
i.e,  ! =   =  and  ! =   =  > 0. Under these assumptions, we have:h !
   e !
i h ! + e ! i
 !
 + !
=
h  
 + e
  

i h     e   i
  
 +  
;
which implies that equation (18) can be rewritten as:
2p = 2Tf + e
h
2  2 
h !
t +
  
t
i

i
+ (19)
 [1 + ]
"
NAm
1

R
# 
1+
264
24
h !
   e
i
[ ! + e]h !
 + !
i
35

1+
+
24
h !
 + e
i
[ !   e]h !
 + !
i
35

1+
375 :
Equation (19) implictly denes a function: G(NA; ; ) = 0. By the implict function
theorem, we know that @NA
@
=  @G
@
= @G
@NA
. Moreover, after some straightforward calculations
(see Appendix A), one can show that @NA
@
b=0> 0, and hence the optimal number of car
commuters is larger in the equilibrium with increasing pollution dispersion (compared with
the case of only background pollution dispersion). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the
e¤ects of the parameter  are slightly less straightforward than those of , since  has both
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a direct and an indirect e¤ect on arrival times. On the one hand, an increased value of 
increases the attractiveness of later arrival (since a later arrival will imply a lower road charge
(
 !
t0 )). On the other hand, it also increases the number of commuters by car, which in turn
might move the arrival time up since more car commuters need to travel in total). As shown
in Appendix A, both e¤ects set against themselves and the nal outcome will depend on the
extent to which each e¤ect o¤sets the other. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that rst
arrival time will be delayed when the environmental damage of emissions is great. Regarding
the last arrival time, an increased value of  will unambiguously delay t1:
A similar argument holds for tra¢ c ows; while it is clear that increased pollution dis-
persion will increase the instant ow f(t0) at those points in time that are close to t1, the
sign of @f(t
0)
@
in the time interval
h !
t0 ;
 !
t
i
is ambiguous as it depends on the sign and mag-
nitude of @t0
@
. Nevertheless, we can show that if @t0
@
 0, it holds that @f(t0)
@
> 0 also in the
time interval
h !
t0 ;
 !
t
i
, since the e¤ect of pollution dispersion increasing the number of cars
commuting dominates the e¤ect of pollution dispersion delaying the trip (see Appendix A).
Note that the length of the time intervals
h !
t0 ;
 !
t1
i
and
h  
t0 ;
  
t1
i
can be calculated as:
 !
t1   !t0 =  [1 + ]
"
NAm
1

R
# 
1+
24
h !
 + e
 !

i h !   e ! i
 !
 + !
35 
1
1+
:
  
t1    t0 =  [1 + ]
"
NAm
1

R
# 
1+
24
h  
 + e
  

i h     e   i
  
 +  
35 
1
1+
:
Since we assume symmetric schedule-delay cost parameters for the morning and afternoon
commute and a constant trend of pollution dispersion (i.e.,
 !
 =   ,  ! =   and  ! =   =
 > 0), we have:
  
t1    t0 !
t1   !t0
=

[ ! +e][ !  e]
 !
 + !
  1
1+

[
 !
 +e][ !  e]
 !
 + !
  1
1+
Given that we know  ! >  ! , it is not di¢ cult to show that [ ! + e]
h !
   e
i
<h !
 + e
i
[ !   e] will hold. This implies that  t1    t0 >  !t1   !t0 . Thus, the evening trip
will be more spread out by the increasing pollution dispersion over the day.
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Let us calculate the number of cars
 !
M1 and
 !
M2 in the interval
h !
t0 ;
 !
t
i
and
h !
t ;
 !
t1
i
from
equations (12) and (13), respectively:
 !
M1 =
Z  !t
 !
t0
f(t0)dt0 =
NA !
 + e
=[
1
 !
 + e
+
1
 !   e ];
 !
M2 =
Z  !t1
 !
t
f(t0)dt0 =
NA !   e=[
1
 !
 + e
+
1
 !   e ];
Di¤erentiating the ratio
 !
M1=
 !
M2 with respect to the  yields:
@(
 !
M1=
 !
M2)
@
=  e
264 [ !   e] +
h !
 + e
i
h !
 + e
i2
375 < 0: (20)
The right-hand side of equation (20) is unambiguously negative. Thus, it is clear that in
relative terms, trips are delayed when there is pollution dispersion to take advantage of the
reduced charge. Similar arguments can be applied to the evening trip as well (through some
straightforward calculation).
3.2 Symmetric schedule-delay cost and non-monotonic pollution
dispersion
We keep the assumption of symmetric schedule-delay cost parameters as in Case 1, i.e., !
 =   and  ! =   , but in contrast to that case, we assume that the pollution dispersion
varies non-monotonically over the day from the background level . For instance, pollution
dispersion can increase in the morning due to increasing temperature
but decline in the evening due to temperature decrease (implying that
 !
 > 0 and
  
 < 0).
Conversely, the pollution dispersion in some cities might be decrease during the morning but
increase during the evening (implying that
 !
 < 0 and
  
 > 0).
Let us assume that pollution dispersion progressively increases in the morning hours (and
then decrease in the evening) and that the magnitude of the variation in pollution dispersion
(though not in direction) is symmetric and equal to  > 0. These assumptions allow us to
specify pollution dispersion capacity as  ! + !t0 in the morning and      t0 in the evening.
Equating the two at time t (when the trend of pollution dispersion is reversed), we know
that    =  ! + 2t. With these assumptions, and since  ! = ,    =  ,    =  ! and
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   =  ! , we can rewrite equation (18) in this case as:
2p = 2Tf + e
h
2  2 !   2t+
h  
t   !t
i

i
+ (21)
 [1 + ]
264NAm 1
R
24
h !
 + e
i
[ !   e]h !
 + !
i
35

1+
+
24 [ !   e]
h !
 + e
i
h !
 + !
i
35

1+
375
Note that if t >
  
t  !t
2
, the total cost of driving in equation (21) is lower than the total cost
of driving in the absence of pollution dispersion variation. Again, let us dene the implicit
function G(NA; ; ) = 0 from equation (21) to compute @NA@ =  @G@ = @G@NA . Nevertheless,
the e¤ects of  on NA will depend on the timing of the reversal of the trend. For instance,
as shown in Appendix A, a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for @G
@
b=0> 0 is that
t <
  
t  !t
2
. This is to say, if pollution dispersion deteriorates for a signicant number of hours,
the derivative @NA
@
b=0 becomes negative, which implies that the number of car commuters
must be reduced to reduce the negative e¤ects of tra¢ c ows on (on average) a stagnant
environment.
Regarding the arrival times, the e¤ects of pollution dispersion on the last arrival time
will depend on the relative magnitude of the environmental damage and on the e¤ect of
pollution dispersion on the optimal number of car commuters (see Appendix A). For instance,
if @NA
@
b=0< 0 (e.g., when t <
  
t  !t
2
), the rst arrival to the o¢ ce will be delayed. This will
also hold if the environmental damage of emissions is severe. Moreover, the last arrival will
be delayed if @NA
@
b=0> 0 or the environmental damage is severe.
Let us analyze the e¤ects of non-monotonic pollution dispersion on the length of the time
intervals
h !
t0 ;
 !
t1
i
and
h  
t0 ;
  
t1
i
. Given
 !
 =  and
  
 =  , the ratio   t1   t0 !
t1  !t0 corresponds to:
  
t1    t0 !
t1   !t0
=

[
  
  e][   +e]
  
 +  
  1
1+

[
 !
 +e][ !  e]
 !
 + !
  1
1+
Since we have assumed that    =  ! and    =  ! , this ratio is equal to one .That is,
the non-monotonicity of pollution dispersion does not a¤ect the symmetry of the patterns
of trip timing in the morning and evening commute. However, this result does not hold if
the time t when the trend of pollution dispersion is reversed occurs at some point within the
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time interval for the morning/evening commute. Let us assume, for instance, that it occurs
in the middle of the time interval for the morning commute. In this case, the overall trend
for the pollution dispersion in the morning is zero and
  
t1    t0 <  !t1   !t0 .
Finally, let us compute the derivative of the ratio
 !
M1=
 !
M2 with respect to , which yields:
@(
 !
M1=
 !
M2)
@
=  e
264 [ !   e] +
h !
 + e
i
h !
 + e
i2
375 < 0:
@(
  
M1=
  
M2)
@
= e
264 [   + e] +
h  
   e
i
h  
   e
i2
375 > 0:
This implies that consistent with the previous case, commutes are postponed to take
advantage of better dispersion conditions and reduced time-varying road charges in the
morning trip. For the evening trip, note we have the trend in pollution dispersion in the
evening is
  
 =   and therefore the sign of the second equation implies that car drivers
commute are relatively earlier to take advantage of better dispersion conditions and reduced
time-varying road charges.
3.3 Asymmetric schedule-delay cost and increasing pollution dis-
persion
So far, our analysis has assumed that the schedule-delay cost parameters are symmetric. In
this section, we investigate the case where the schedule-delay cost parameters are asymmet-
ric. Let us compute the ratio
  
t1   t0 !
t1  !t0 and evaluate it when  = 0, which yields:
"  
t1    t0 !
t1   !t0
#
j=0 =
24        +   !
  ! !
 + !
35
 1
1+
:
Let us assume that
 !
 >   and  ! >   , which implies that the cost of arriving home late is
lower than the cost of arriving to the o¢ ce early and that the cost of arriving home early is
not as high as arriving to the o¢ ce late. It is possible to show that for such a combination of
parameters, it holds that
  
t1    t0 >  !t1   !t0 , which is consistent with empirical evidence and
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implies that the evening commute lasts longer and is more spread out.5 Let us now study
the e¤ects of pollution dispersion. Di¤erentiating the ratio of the number of car commuters
who arrive before and after the desired time with respect to  yields:
@(
 !
M1=
 !
M2)
@
=  e
264 [ !   e] +
h !
 + e
i
h !
 + e
i2
375 < 0;
@(
  
M1=
  
M2)
@
=  e
264 [     e] +
h  
 + e
i
h  
 + e
i2
375 < 0;
which implies that both during morning and evening commutes, trips are delayed when
there is an increasing trend in pollution dispersion in order to take advantage of the re-
duced time-varying charge. Furthermore, we can show that
@( !M1= !M2)@ b=0 > @(  M1=  M2)@ b=0
if
h  

i2 h ! + ! i > h ! i2 h   +   i, implying that the e¤ect of pollution dispersion is larger
during the morning commute. The reverse holds when this condition does not hold. Hence,
the relative magnitude of the schedule-delay cost parameters will determine whether pol-
lution dispersion increases the share of trips arriving later than the preferred time during
morning or evening commutes the most.
4 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we present a numerical example to complement the analytical analysis above.
Table 1 presents the parameters used in the analysis, where the parameters in the rst column
follow the values used by Chu (1995) and those in the second column are set by the authors.
5Note that under these assumptions, it holds that
 !
 ! !
+ ! =
1
1 !

+ 1 !
>
  
    
+   =
1
1  

+ 1  
:
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
N 1000 e 1 unit/vehicle
 $ 6.40/hour  8
 !
 $ 3.90/hour  ! 0.3
 ! $ 15.21/hour  0.025
 !
t 8 am
  
t 5 pm
R 3817 vehicles/hour p $ 5
 4.08 t 13.00
Smax 25 miles/hour
  
 case specic
m 15 miles    case specic
Tf 37.2 minutes
Table 1: Parameters for numerical simulation
As mentioned earlier (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2), symmetric schedule-delay cost in a round
trip implies that
!
 =
 
 and
!
 =
 
 . Therefore, let us set
 
 = $15:21=hour and
 
 =
$3:90=hour to reect this case. For Case 3, where we have asymmetric schedule-delay cost,
we instead set
 
 = 12 and
 
 = 2. With these parameters and those in Table 1, one
can simulate arrival times, tra¢ c ows, optimal number of commuters, and social costs of
commuting by car for our three cases. In what follows, we highlight the comparison across
di¤erent cases.
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NA TCMC Car TCEC Car TC All Commutes Revenues
Case 1
Optimal Toll 635 5920 4726 14297 5277
Toll NPD 432 5588 5588 16855 7584
Case 2
Optimal Toll 571 5260 5146 14697 5636
Toll NPD 432 5588 5588 16855 7584
Case 3
Optimal Toll 816 7855 5792 14538 6736
Toll NPD 562 7397 7142 15487 9867
Table 2: Optimal Charge and Social Costs of Commuting by Car
Through simulations it can be found that the optimal number of car commuters for Case
1 (where we have monotonically increasing pollution dispersion capacity) is larger than in
Case 2 (where pollution dispersion deteriorates from 1pm). Moreover, as shown in Table 2,
in both Case 1 and Case 2, the optimal number of car commuters is larger than in the case
where pollution dispersion is disregarded (e.g., 635 and 571 commuters vs. 432 commuters,
which corresponds to an increase of about 32% and 25% in the number of commuters,
respectively). Besides, the morning rush hour starts earlier and ends later in Case 1 than
in Case 2. Figure 1 also shows the di¤erence in the instant ow of morning trip in the two
cases. Not surprisingly, the instant ow is also higher in Case 1. Thus, the results indicate
that the monotonically increasing pollution dispersion capacity over the day would allows
more people to drive in equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the optimal time-varying road charges
for the two cases. It can be seen that during the morning trip, the tolls are higher for Case
1, whereas the tolls are higher for Case 2 during the evening trip. Specically, as shown in
the gure, the optimal toll during the morning peak is $5.96 in Case 1 and $5.77 in Case 2,
and during the evening peak it is $4.04 and $5.60, respectively.
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Figure 1: Tra¢ c Flows
Regarding the comparison of Case 1 and 3, it can be found that the optimal number of
car commuters in Case 3 is 816, which is larger than that in Case 1. Also, Figure 1 shows
that the evening commute lasts much longer and is more spread out in Case 3 than in Case
1. Therefore, we can see that the asymmetric schedule delay-costs are very important in
determining the daily commuting pattern and therefore the optimal time-varying charges
over the day. The pattern of the time-varying road charge is interesting as Figure 2 shows
that in Case 3, the charge must be higher during the morning commute to correct for the
higher concentration of travel times and reduced pollution dispersion. The charge is greatly
reduced during the evening commute (e.g., the charges during morning and evening peaks
are $6.38 and $3.54, respectively).
Finally, note that in all cases, the optimal time variation in the charge requires the
charge to be lower during the evening commute, while an analysis that disregards pollution
dispersion can lead to symmetric (variable) charges. Furthermore, the fact that pollution
dispersion could reduce the magnitude of the optimal charges is good news as it increases
the political feasibility of this policy instrument.
19
Figure 2: Optimal Road Pricing
Indeed, as shown in Table 2, taking pollution dispersion into account in the optimal design of
road charges would not only allow more commuters to drive (compared with the road charges
that do not take pollution dispersion into account, denoted as Toll NPD), but would also
reduce the social cost of commuting by car in mornings and evenings (denoted as TCMC Car
and TCEC Car in the table), as well as the overall cost of commuting (which includes the
costs of those trips by bus). For Cases 1 and 2 the reduction in the social cost of commuting
is about 15%, and for Case 3 it corresponds to about 7%. Since pollution dispersion reduces
the optimal road charges, it does also reduce the total revenues from roads charges (which
correspond to about 70% of the revenues of the case when pollution dispersion is not taken
into account).
Our numerical simulation is sensitive to the magnitude of the environmental damage.
If we, for example, were to increase the magnitude of the damage parameter from  = 8
to  = 12, we would nd that the optimal number of car commuters is reduced in all
cases (corresponding to 554, 478, and 709 for Cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We would
also observe that greater damage leads to a more concentrated tra¢ c ow and higher tolls
compared with the reference cases (optimal tolls at the morning peak would correspond to
$7.77, $7.58, and $8.16 for Cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For evening peak, the optimal
tolls are $4.92, $7.26, and $4.45, respectively).
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5 Conclusions
Considering the urgency of improving air quality in many cities and countries around the
world, it is important to design and implement environmental policy instruments that restrict
emissions when they cause the most damage. Our study generates new insights regarding
how road pricing should be designed to maximize social welfare by choosing a time-varying
road charge that takes into account the dynamics of pollution. In particular, our results
show that by taking pollution dispersion into account, the social costs of commuting can
be reduced and tra¢ c ows can be increased. Moreover, the optimal time variation of the
charge requires the charge to be lower during the evening commute, while an analysis that
disregards pollution dispersion can lead to symmetric (variable) charges. Furthermore, the
fact that pollution dispersion could reduce the magnitude of the optimal charges is good
news as it increases the political feasibility of this policy instrument. From an analytical
perspective, our results show that pollution dispersion breaks the symmetry between morning
and evening commutes, even with identical schedule delay costs.
Our analysis is simplied in many respects. For instance, one critical assumption of our
model is that the morning and evening travel schedules are independent of each other. That
is, the morning scheduling preferences are dened in terms of arrival time at work, whereas
the preferences for the evening are dened in terms of arrival time at home; the preferred
morning arrival time at work and the preferred evening arrival time at home, however, are
separated and predetermined. One idea for further research is to extend our analysis to the
case when the morning and evening commuting decisions are more interlinked.
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Appendix A
Case 1: Symmetric schedule-delay cost and increasing pollution dis-
persion
NA is determined by equation (19), which denes an implicit function G(NA; ; ) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem, we know that:
@NA
@
=  
@G
@
@G
@NA
:
Di¤erentiating G(NA; ; ) with respect to  and NA and evaluating when  = 0 (to account
for the marginal variation in outcomes when there is no pollution dispersion variation) yields:
@G
@
b=0 =  e
h !
t +
  
t
i
< 0;
@G
@NA
b=0 =

m
NAb=0R
 1
1+
24"  !  ! !
 + !
# 
1+
+
"  !
  !
 !
 + !
# 
1+
35 > 0:
Thus, @NA
@
b=0> 0, implying that the number of car commuters will be larger with an
increasing pollution dispersion than with constant pollution dispersion ( = 0).
Regarding the e¤ects of pollution dispersion variation on the rst and last arrival times,
we di¤erentiate equations (15) and (16) with respect to  and evaluate them when  = 0,
which yields:
@t0
@
b=0 = 

"
m
1

R [ + ]
# 
1+
[NAb=0]
 1
1+

e [ + ]NAb=0 @NA
@
b=0

;(22)
@t1
@
b=0 = 

"
m
1

R [ + ]
# 
1+
[NAb=0]
 1
1+

e [ + ]NAb=0+@NA
@
b=0

:(23)
Thus, an increase in  causes two countervailing e¤ects on t0. First, it increases the attrac-
tiveness of later arrival. Second, it increases the number of people who will drive, which in
turn may move the start time back (since more car commuters need to travel in total). The
rst e¤ect dominates when
e >
 @NA
@
b=0
[ + ]NAb=0 : (24)
This is to say, the rst arrival will be delayed (i.e., @t0
@
b=0> 0) when the environmental
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e¤ects of emissions are large. In contrast, it is clear that @t1
@
b=0> 0, which implies that an
increased pollution dispersion will delay the last arrival for sure.
By analogy, di¤erentiating f(t0) in equation (11) with respect to  yields:
@f(t0)
@
=
8><>:
R

h
+e
m[1+]
[t0   t0]
i 1 

h
e[t0 t0]
m[1+]
  @t0
@
h
+e
m[1+]
ii
if t0  t0  t ,
R

h
 e
m[1+]
[t1   t0]
i 1 

h
 e[t1 t0]
m[1+]
+ @t1
@
h
 e
m[1+]
ii
if t  t0  t1 .
Hence, the sign of @f(t
0)
@
in the time interval t0  t0  t depends on the sign of @t0@ . For
points in time where t0 is very close to t0, the sign of
@f(t0)
@
will be opposite to that of @t0
@
.
As regards @f(t
0)
@
in the time interval t  t0  t1, we know that for the point in time when
t0 is very close to t1, the sign of
@f(t0)
@
would be consistent with @t1
@
.
Case 2: Symmetric schedule-delay cost and non-monotonic pollution disper-
sion
NA is determined by equation (21), which denes an implicit function G(NA; ; ) = 0.
Di¤erentiating G(NA; ; ) with respect to  and NA and evaluating when  = 0 yields:
@G
@
b=0 =  e
24h2t  h  t   !t ii  m [NAb=0]
R
 1
1+
242"  !  ! !
 + !
#  1
1+
h !   ! i
 !
 + !
3535 ;
@G
@NA
b=0 =

m
NAb=0R
 1
1+
24"  !  ! !
 + !
# 
1+
+
"  !
  !
 !
 + !
# 
1+
35 > 0:
Thus, @G
@
b=0 is clearly positive when t <
  
t  !t
2
, i.e., when pollution dispersion deteri-
orates during most of the day. In such case, @NA
@
b=0< 0, which implies that the optimal
number of car commuters is reduced in order to reduce the negative e¤ects of tra¢ c ows
in a stagnant environment. Otherwise, the sign of @NA
@
b=0 would be ambiguous.
Regarding the e¤ects of pollution dispersion on arrival times, the results for the deriva-
tives (@t0
@
b=0 and @t1@ b=0) in the previous section still hold. Moreover, if @NA@ b=0< 0 or the
environmental damage of emissions is severe, it is clear from equation (22) that @t0
@
b=0> 0,
which implies that the rst arrival to o¢ ce will be delayed. t1 will be clearly delayed in the
cases where @NA
@
b=0> 0 or the environmental damage of emissions is severe.
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Case 3: Asymmetric schedule-delay cost and increasing pollution dispersion
NA is determined by equation (18), which denes an implicit function G(NA; ; ) = 0.
By the implicit function theorem, we know that:
@NA
@
=  
@G
@
@G
@NA
:
Di¤erentiating G(NA; ; ) with respect to  and NA and evaluating when  = 0 yields:
@G
@
b=0 =  e
hh !
t +
  
t
i
   
i
;
@G
@NA
b=0 =

mNAb=0
R
 1
1+
24"  !  ! !
 + !
# 
1+
+
"   
  
  
 +  
# 
1+
35 > 0:
where
  =

m [NAb=0]
R
 1
1+
24"  !  ! !
 + !
# 1
1+
h !   ! i
 !
 + !
35+ "       
 +  
# 
1+
h       i
  
 +  
> 0:
Thus, @G
@
b=0 is negative when   <
h !
t +
  
t
i
. In such case, @NA
@
> 0:
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